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Abstract The structure of societies depends, to some extent, on the incentives of the individuals they
are composed of. We study a stylized model of this interplay, that suggests that the more individuals
aim at climbing the social hierarchy, the more society’s hierarchy gets strong. Such a dependence is
sharp, in the sense that a persistent hierarchical order emerges abruptly when the preference for social
status gets larger than a threshold. This phase transition has its origin in the fact that the presence of
a well defined hierarchy allows agents to climb it, thus reinforcing it, whereas in a “disordered” society
it is harder for agents to find out whom they should connect to in order to become more central.
Interestingly, a social order emerges when agents strive harder to climb society and it results in a state
of reduced social mobility, as a consequence of ergodicity breaking, where climbing is more difficult.
1 Introduction
The emergence of social elites has interested social scientists ever since Pareto’s observation of persistent
inequalities in our societies [17]. Inequality is acceptable if it results from differences of individuals in
terms of their capabilities, but not if it results, in one way or another, from discrimination1. Not only
discrimination conflicts with ethical principles that all individuals are a priori equal and should have
access to the same opportunities. It also damages societies in terms of efficiency [21] as it hampers
social mobility, preventing society from promoting individuals to positions in the social hierarchy that
are consistent with their capabilities.
We introduce the social climbing game, a highly stylized model of a society, where individuals
attempt to optimize their position in the network, by becoming as central as possible. The assumptions
of the model are rooted on empirical and theoretical evidence coming from the social sciences. There, in
the early years of network analysis, it was found that the importance of an individual within a network
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1 India’s cast system or racial segregation in the US and South Africa in the last century, are examples of
explicit discrimination of underprivileged groups, that in the course of time has come to be regarded more
and more as unacceptable, prompting for explicit measures of affirmative action (e.g. quotas for lower casts in
India).
2is related to some quantification of how central [3,25] this agent is. There exist different metrics which
measure the centrality of a node (among others: degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector) [10], each
one highlighting different facets of this generic concept.
Among the empirical analyses, there is a body of literature showing that centrality explains the
role, importance, or payoffs of the agents constituting the network: in informal structures within
organizations, the importance of people is related to their betweenness centrality [7]; students with an
higher centrality in the friendship network were found to perform better in education tests [8]2. From
the theoretical side, Ref. [2] shows that in a broad class of games, player’s payoffs increase with their
(Bonacich) centrality [6] in the network. Because of this, if individuals can alter their neighborhood,
the myopic best response strategy is simply to connect to the neighbor who increases their centrality
the most.
Interestingly, Ko¨enig et al. [13] have shown that when individuals strive to be as central as possible,
the exact measure of centrality is irrelevant, and the dynamics yields a network which has the property
of nestedness: the neighborhood of any node contains the neighborhood of the nodes which have a
lower degree. In this kind of networks, the ranking of nodes according to their centrality is the same,
regardless of the centrality measure considered [12]. Remarkably, nested structures have been found
in inter-organizational networks of research and development (R&D) alliances [24,20], in interbank
payment networks [22] and in firm competition under oligopolies [11]. This kind of structures will be
precisely the ones emerging in the social climbing game. In this respect, our results confer stability to
those of Ref. [12] and generalize them in non-trivial ways.
This study suggests that the assumption that individual freedom promotes social mobility is a non-
trivial one. This is because the structure of a society, while constraining the set of opportunities that
are available to individuals, depends on the very incentives of individuals in complex ways. In this paper
we show that this interplay may produce very “rigid” societies, with extremely low social mobility,
characterized by persistent inequalities between a priori equal individuals3. The understanding of this
phenomenon hinges on the concept of ergodicity breaking that occurs in strongly interacting systems,
when a symmetry – here related to the a priori equality among individuals – is spontaneously broken.
This phenomenon, well known in statistical physics, is an emergent collective property, and it manifests
only when the system is large enough. Remarkably, we find that persistent inequality with low mobility
occurs precisely when the quest for “power” – i.e. for occupying the most central or important place in
the social hierarchy – becomes a dominant component of what motivates the behavior of individuals.
In words, our model epitomizes an apparent positive feedback between the intensity of the efforts
of individuals to “climb” the social hierarchy and the structure of a society: on the one hand, the more
a society is hierarchically structured, the easier it is for individuals to understand how to climb it. On
the other, the efforts of agents to climb the hierarchy reinforce the social ranking as individuals rewire
their links from less to more influential individuals. We discuss this interplay in a highly stylized model
of a society, that while being very far from realistic, serves as a proof of concept and allows us to unveil
the mechanism responsible for the emergence of a persistent inequality in a transparent manner.
In addition, this approach shows the relevance of techniques used in statistical mechanics [19,18]
in the context of social networks. Similar models to the one considered here have been discussed in
Refs. [16,23]) that, however, focus mostly on topological properties of the emerging networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we introduce the model and discuss the
main properties of the dynamics and its associated global potential function; related to these results,
in Appendix A, the ergodicity of the system is proved. Later, in Sect. 3 we show the results of extensive
numerical simulations that portray the characteristic behavior of the system. Finally, in Sect. 4, the
conclusions are drawn.
2 The model
We consider a system composed of N individuals, who are connected through a network which consists
of exactly M links. The network is undirected and thus can be specified in terms of a symmetric
adjacency matrix aˆ = {aij}Ni,j=1, with elements aij = aji = 1, if i and j are connected, aij = aji =
2 A more comprehensive list can be found in Ref. [13].
3 The positive relationship between intergenerational social mobility and inequality has been consistently
reported in several empirical studies [26,4,1].
30 otherwise. Agents receive opportunities to use their links in order to get in contact with more
“influential” members of the society, in brief to climb the social network.
As a measure of importance of the individuals, we take the number of his/her partners4, i.e. the
degree ki =
∑
j aij . As a measure of the “social capital” of agent i we take the following local utility
function
ui =
N∑
j,ℓ=1
aijajℓ + µ
N∑
ℓ=1
aiℓ =
N∑
j=1
aijkj + µ ki, (1)
that depends both on the centrality ki of agent i and on the centrality kj of his/her neighbors, with µ
tuning the relative weight between the two terms5 The efforts of agents to climb the social hierarchy
can then be formalized in the maximization of the utility ui.
We then define the dynamics as follows,
1. At any time, an agent i is picked at random together with one of her neighbors, j. Then, a neighbor
ℓ of j is selected at random, ℓ 6= i.
2. If ℓ is already connected to i, nothing happens. Otherwise, with probability
p(i,j)→(i,ℓ) =
eβ∆ui
1 + eβ∆ui
, (2)
the link (i, j) is replaced with (or rewired to) link (i, ℓ), where ∆ui is the corresponding change in
i’s utility.
The step 1 models random encounters between agents through their network of interactions. In such
an encounter, agent i gets to know a friend ℓ of j, as well as his/her importance (the number kℓ of
ℓ’s friends). The probabilistic choice rule in step 2 can be derived from a random utility model where
agents maximize a more complex utility function, that accounts for the fact that the social network
affects in complex ways the well being of individuals and their unobserved choices in other dimensions6.
In this view, β plays the role of the relative weight between the observed and the unobserved part
of the utility in the the choice of social contacts and it reflects the prevalence of the quest for social
status in their choice behavior7. In particular, in the limit β → ∞, a move implying a decrease in
the utility function is never accepted. This means that the social status is valued so highly by the
agents that everything else is unimportant. On the contrary, for β = 0 the probability of accepting a
move implying a decrease of the utility function is 1/2, meaning that the social status has negligible
importance with respect to the unobserved part of the utility. The general question addressed is then
how strong should the parameter β be in order for a social hierarchy to form and be maintained in the
long run?
It is worth to remark that if the utility of agent i increases when rewiring the link (i, j) to (i, ℓ),
then the utility of agent j decreases, while that of agent ℓ increases. This embodies the fact that
the formation of a new link needs the consent of both parties, but their removal can be unilateral.
Therefore, we can interpret the rewiring mechanism as a process according to which agent i looks for
some social premium (e.g. knowledge of information, professional expertise) that agent ℓ can provide
more than agent j. Once agent i secures his/her connection to agent ℓ, agent j essentially represents
4 Other measures of centrality can be taken but, as observed in Ref. [12], these rank individuals in the
same order in strongly hierarchical networks, that will be stable over time as we shall see later. Conversely,
unstructured networks correspond to random rankings with no stable order, with respect to all centrality
measures.
5 As will be clear in the following, the second term in (1) is irrelevant for the dynamics, but not for the
interpretation of the local utility. For example, consider the limit case of a star: while the central node is
connected to N − 1 nodes, all other nodes have only one connection. In this case the first term in (1) is equal
to N −1 for all nodes and only the term proportional to ki removes this degeneracy. Note that the second term
in (1) also describes a linear cost µ < 0 to maintain links.
6 This idea can be precisely formalized assuming that ui(aˆ) is the observed part of the utility, but that agent i
maximize a more complex function Ui(aˆ,b) = ui(aˆ)+vi(b|aˆ) where vi(b|aˆ) is a random unobserved contribution
to the utility, that depends on a vector b of unobserved choices. Assuming that vi(b|aˆ) are independent
and identically distributed, it can be shown (See [9] p. 33 for an explicit derivation) that maxb Ui(aˆ,b) =
ui(aˆ) + ηi(aˆ)/β, where ηi(aˆ) are i.i.d. with a Gumbel distribution. It is well known [14] that if aˆ
∗ is the choice
that maximizes ui(aˆ) + ηi(aˆ)/β, then P{aˆ
∗ = aˆ} is given by Eq. (2).
7 For example, Adam may be reluctant to interrupt his relation with Bob, despite his low rank in society,
because he is his only friend who shares his interest in Japanese paintings.
4a redundant, less central source of the same capital, and this is why the rewiring operation happens
at his/her expenses. Moreover, the rewiring mechanism described above implies that, in their quest to
become central, agents increase the likelihood to be selected by others as new partners.
Notice finally that the number of links is conserved in the dynamics. Hence the density of links is
the second important dimension that we shall explore, in order to understand how the structure of
social organization depends on it.
2.1 Properties of the dynamics and potential function
There are some remarkable features of the dynamics of the model introduced in the previous sections.
We detail them now.
First, it is easy to see that the dynamics introduced preserves connected components. Indeed,
nodes are never disconnected by the dynamics because, even if they have just one link, this will not
be rewired because the neighbor upstream has no second neighbor where to rewire. Therefore, without
loss of generality, we restrict attention to the case where M ≥ N − 1 and the network is composed
of a single connected component. Networks composed of disjoint components remain disjoint under
the dynamics above, hence the dynamics of different components can be considered independently.
Alternative dynamics that do not preserve connectedness – e.g. adding the link (i, ℓ) to a neighbor ℓ
of a neighbor j, and removing a link different from (i, j) chosen in any way – would converge to simple
structures characterized by cliques of ∼
√
M nodes in a sea of disconnected nodes. Indeed, it is easy to
check that such configurations correspond to absorbing states of the dynamics for all β. On the other
hand, as we shall discuss in a moment, it is precisely the rewiring procedure we propose in Section 2
that produces non-trivial equilibrium states.
Notice that, since both the number N of nodes and M of edges is conserved during the evolution
of the system, the number of fundamental cycles in the graph is also conserved. This follows from the
fact that the number of fundamental cycles in a graph is equal to M −N +K, where K is the number
of connected components (see [5, Ch. 2]).
The dynamics of the model admits a potential which is just the global utility, i.e. the sum of the
utilities U =
∑
i ui. Indeed, let us consider the change ∆ux in the utility of the agent x when the
rewiring (i, j) into (i, ℓ) occurs. Depending on the position of x in the network, the following changes
are obtained:
∆ui = kℓ − kj + 1 (3a)
∆uj = 1− ki − µ (3b)
∆uℓ = ki − 1 + µ (3c)
∆uh = −1 ∀h ∈ ∂j \ {i, ℓ} (3d)
∆ug = +1 ∀g ∈ ∂ℓ \ {j} (3e)
∆ux = +0 ∀x 6= i, j, ℓ, x /∈ ∂j ∪ ∂ℓ , (3f)
where ∂x is the set of the neighbors of x, before the move.
In the total variation of the utility ∆U =
∑
x∆ux, the term ∆uh appears kj − 2 times, while the
term ∆ug appears kℓ − 1 times, because kx is the degree of the node x before the rewiring. Gathering
all the contributions one has:
∆U = ∆ui +∆uj +∆uℓ + (kj − 2)∆uh + (kℓ − 1)∆ug
= 2(kℓ − kj + 1) = 2∆ui . (4)
The last point implies that, provided the dynamics is ergodic, which is proven in Appendix A, the
system converges to thermal equilibrium with Hamiltonian
H = −U = −
∑
i
k2i − µ
∑
i
ki,
and fixed density of links at temperature 2/β8. Notice that the second term does not play any role,
being
∑
i ki a fixed quantity in our case. Indeed the dynamics in Eq. (2) is equivalent to Metropolis
8 The factor 2 comes from the fact that the variation of the global utility is the double of the variation of
the local utility.
5Fig. 1 (Color online) Snapshot of networks of the social climbing game for N = 100, M = 125 for β = 0.03
(left panel) and β = 0.1 (right panel). Size of the nodes is proportional to the degree.
dynamics, and hence it samples the Gibbs distribution P{aˆ} ∝ eβU(aˆ)/2, which is known in sociology
as the 2-star model. Park and Newman [19,18], have shown that the 2-star model where the density of
links is not fixed, exhibits a sharp phase transition. This result suggests that there might be a phase
transition also in the model we study in this paper. As a byproduct, our discussion also provides a
microeconomic derivation for the 2-star model9.
3 Numerical simulations
In order to investigate the behavior of the model, we performed extensive numerical simulations sam-
pling the Gibbs distribution P{aˆ} ∝ eβU(aˆ)/2 using the Metropolis algorithm based on the rewiring
moves introduced in Sect. 2. All the results to be presented throughout the rest of this section were
obtained, for each value of β, by performing R rewiring proposals per node, and we checked that the
value R = 5 · 105 is large enough to always ensure the attainment of an equilibrium state. Fig. 1 shows
two typical realizations of the social network for small and large values of β (see caption for more de-
tails). Fig. 1 suggests that, as anticipated in the previous section, the social climbing model undergoes
a transition from hierarchical to random structures. In the following, we will show the presence of a
phase transition between these two states.
In Fig. 2 we show the largest degree of the network Φ = maxi ki as a function of the inverse
temperature β for systems with N = 100 nodes and M = 110, 200, 300, 500 links. As can be seen, in
9 The case studied in ref. [19,18] where the number of links is also allowed to change, can be recovered in
a model where, in addition to rewiring steps discussed above, we also allow for link creation upon random
encounters and link obsolescence (i.e. decay). More precisely, consider a model where each agent receives
opportunities i) to rewire his/her links (as above) at rate ν and ii) to form new links (with randomly chosen
agents), with rate η/2. In addition, each link decays with rate 1. Then, in a time interval ∆t, the number of
links changes by ∆M = ηN∆t −M∆t, which means that in the stationary state 〈M〉 = ηN .
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Fig. 2 (Color online) Dependence of the largest degree Φ (divided by N) in the social climbing network as a
function of the inverse temperature (or intensity of choice parameter) β. The different curves refer to N = 100
and M = 110, 200, 300, 500. For each value of β the reported values of Φ are obtained by averaging over 100
networks. An abrupt change in is observed in all curves after a threshold value of β, with Φ/N going from low
values to values close to one, signaling the emergence of a star, i.e. a link with O(N) links, in the network.
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Fig. 3 (Color online) Left panel: density plot depicting the full distribution of the maximum degree (divided
by N) as a function of the average degree obtained by binning the results relative to 100 networks, at inverse
temperature β = 0.01 and number of nodes N = 500. High (low) values are darker (lighter). Right panel:
average maximum degree (divided by N) as a function of the average degree and β for N = 100; results
obtained by averaging over 100 networks. Clearly, for low values of k¯ the network is in the disordered phase,
while for high values of β it is in the ordered phase.
all cases the system actually undergoes a transition, going from a phase where the largest degree Φ is
roughly of order 1−10 (depending on the relative size of N andM) to a phase where the largest degree
is of order N . These observations qualitatively match the findings of [16], where a prediction for the
critical temperature Tc = 1/βc characterizing this phase transition was also derived, from combinatorial
arguments, for networks with average degree k¯ = 2M/N < 2, i.e. for disconnected graphs. The nature
of the phase transition depicted in Fig. 2 is further investigated in Fig. 3. In the left panel we show the
full distribution of Φ/N with respect to k¯ obtained by binning the results relative to 100 networks, for
β = 0.01 and N = 500. For low (high) values of k¯ the distribution is sharply concentrated around zero
(one) and a steep transition occurs at a critical value of k¯, meaning that the average is representative
of the distribution of Φ/N . Completely analogous results are found for different values of β. Therefore,
in order to characterize the transition more precisely, in the right panel of Fig. 3 we show the relation
between the average of Φ/N over 100 networks with respect to both k¯ and β.
In Fig. 4 we analyze the dependence of the critical value of β with respect to the size N of
the network, while keeping the average degree fixed, for k¯ = 2.5, 5.0. Qualitatively it is clear that,
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Fig. 4 (Color online) Left panel: Dependence between the maximum degree (divided by N) and β, for k¯ = 2.5
and different values of N . Results are averaged over 100 networks. The transition become sharper and the
critical value of β shifts to the left for increasing values of N . Right panel: as in the left panel for k¯ = 5.0.
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Fig. 5 (Color online) Finite-size scaling for determining the critical value in the thermodynamic limit βc,
assuming the functional form β∗(N) = βc + aN
−1.25, where β∗(N) is the critical value at size N . By best
fitting we find: for k¯ = 2.5: βc = (1.1± 0.2) · 10
−2, while for k¯ = 5.0: βc = (2.6± 0.2) · 10
−3.
increasing N , both the transition becomes sharper and the critical value of β shifts to the left. In
order to understand if the critical value in thermodynamic limit βc is nonzero, we analyze the finite-
size scaling behavior, assuming β∗(N) = βc + aN
−b, where β∗(N) is the critical value at size N
and βc, a and b are free parameters. Since b is expected to be universal (i.e. not dependent on the
other parameters, like k¯), it is reasonable to choose it by plotting β∗(N) against N−b until straight
lines are obtained. Both a and βc are then found by a best fit. The value of β
∗(N) is obtained by a
linear interpolation of the curves in Fig. 4 and calculating the value of β such that Φ/N = 1/2. From
Fig. 5 it can be clearly seen that for b = 1.25 the assumed functional form is fully consistent with
numerical simulations up the investigated system size. The values we find for βc are soundly different
from zero within 95% confidence intervals provided by best fit. In particular we find for k¯ = 2.5:
βc = (1.1± 0.2) · 10−2, while for k¯ = 5.0: βc = (2.6± 0.2) · 10−3.10
Following [16], let us define a star as a node whose degree is of order N . Then, it is immediate to
figure out that, depending on the ratio M/N , different number of stars might emerge in the network
for temperatures lower than Tc. Clearly, in the case N = 100, M = 110 (i.e. k¯ only slightly larger
than 2), the appearance of a star (Φ ≃ 100 in this case) below the critical temperature leaves very
10 Inspired by [16] we also performed finite-size scaling analysis according to the functional form: β∗(N) =
βc + a(M/ log(N))
−b, which also gives values of βc soundly above zero and consistent with the ones discussed
in the main text.
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Fig. 6 (Color online) Inverse participation ratio of the normalized degree sequence I(v) as a function of the
inverse temperature β. Different curves refer to networks with N = 100 and M = 110, 200, 300. Results
obtained by averaging over 100 networks. For large enough β one recovers the maximal number of stars.
few links to be distributed amongst the remaining nodes. On the other hand, increasing the number
of links provides enough room for the emergence of a larger number of stars. In other words, it is
intuitively reasonable to expect a system with an average degree k¯ ≃ 2n to produce, for sufficiently low
temperatures, exactly n stars. In order to support such an intuitive line of reasoning, we computed the
inverse participation ratios (IPRs) of the degree sequences v = (k1, k2, . . . , kN )/
√∑N
i=1 k
2
i of several
networks with different numbers of nodes and links. Given a normalized vector v, its IPR is defined as
I(v) =
(
N∑
i=1
v4i
)−1
. (5)
The IPR of a completely localized vector, say v = (1, 0, . . . , 0), is equal to one. On the other hand,
the IPR of a fully delocalized vector, whose components are all equal to vi ≃ 1/
√
N , is of order N .
In our case I(v) gives an estimate of the number of dominant nodes in the network. In Fig. 6 we plot
the IPRs I(v), as functions of β, for N = 100 nodes and M = 110, 200, 300. As can be seen, the
IPR of the sparsest network, i.e. the one with M = 110, essentially drops down to one right below its
critical temperature. On the other hand, systems with a larger number of links undergo a less trivial
evolution: after the initial drop below the critical temperature, the IPR increases and eventually reaches
a steady state. In the example shown in Fig. 6, the system with M = 200 links reaches a steady value
I(v) ≃ 2.12 ± 0.03, whereas the system with M = 300 reaches I(v) ≃ 3.28 ± 0.06 (where the errors
represent the 68% confidence intervals obtained by averaging over 100 networks), and such values
clearly show that the maximal number of stars allowed by the relative sizes of N and M has been
achieved. Moreover, these observations are consistent with the small temporary decrease of the largest
degree Φ which can be observed in Fig. 2 for systems with k¯ > 2 when the inverse temperature is
slightly larger than its critical value.
3.1 Correlations and social mobility
As already explained in Sect. 1, one of the goals of the present paper is to model the positive feedback
mechanism between the individuals’ effort to climb the social hierarchy and the subsequent reinforce-
ment of the social hierarchy itself. Suppose that a given social network reaches its equilibrium state,
at a certain inverse temperature β, after t0 steps of the social climbing dynamics described in Sect. 2.
Let us denote the corresponding graph’s adjacency matrix as aˆ(t0). Then, one way of quantitatively
describing how mobile or “frozen” a society is would be to assess the level of correlation, according
to some proper notion, between aˆ(t0) and a following configurations aˆ(t), where t = t0 +∆t for some
positive ∆t. We will now measure correlations by means of Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient. Given
the joint set of all matrix entries in aˆ(t0) and aˆ(t), let us focus, for example, on entries (i, j) and (h, ℓ)
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Fig. 7 (Color online) Kendall’s τ coefficient (see (6)) measurements for networks with N = 100 and M = 300.
All measurements are performed between an initial equilibrium configuration aˆ(t0) and later configurations
aˆ(t0 + n∆t), with t0 = ∆t = 5 · 10
6 Monte Carlo steps. The different curves refer to inverse temperatures
β = 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, respectively corresponding to values below, slightly above and well above the critical value
for the system under study (see also Fig. 2). Results obtained by averaging over 100 networks.
in both matrices. Then, if both aij(t0) > ahℓ(t0) and aij(t) > ahℓ(t), or if both aij(t0) < ahℓ(t0)
and aij(t) < ahℓ(t), the pairs (aij(t0), ahℓ(t0)) and (aij(t), ahℓ(t)) are said to be concordant. On the
contrary, if aij(t0) ≷ ahℓ(t0) and aij(t) ≶ ahℓ(t) the pairs (aij(t0), ahℓ(t0)) and (aij(t), ahℓ(t)) are said
to be discordant. Of course, since the adjacency matrix entries equal zero or one at each time, ties will
often happen either at time t0 or at time t (or at both times). Kendall’s correlation coefficient τ reads
τ(∆t) =
C −D√
C +D + Tt0
√
C +D + Tt
, (6)
where C (D) is the numbers of concordant (discordant) pairs, whereas Tt0 (Tt) denotes the number of
time-t0 (time-t) ties. Pairs where ties happen both at t0 and t are not taken into account.
In Fig. 7 a few examples of Kendall’s τ coefficient’s time evolution are sketched. All plots refer
to networks with N = 100 nodes and M = 300 links. Here, ∆t = t0 = 5 · 106 elementary Monte
Carlo moves, i.e. rewiring proposals. As can be seen, when the social climbing game takes place for
temperatures higher than the critical one, Kendall’s τ quickly starts to fluctuate around zero, denoting
no genuine correlation between configurations distant (in time). This we take as indication of a large
social mobility. On the other hand, for temperatures slightly lower than the critical one, Kendall’s
τ remains significantly larger than zero over several time lags. However, a downward trend is clearly
visible in this case, meaning that for temperatures T . Tc social mobility is recovered after a sufficiently
long time. On the contrary, for temperatures significantly lower than the critical one Kendall’s τ
essentially remains constant and very large (i.e. close to one) over large time lags, hinting at an
extremely reduced social mobility, possibly preventing the majority of individuals from climbing the
social ladder.
The above considerations on individuals’ mobility in the social climbing game can be further clarified
and understood more deeply. For these purposes, let us denote as qi the fraction of agents who, at a
given time, have a strictly lower degree than agent i, i.e.
qi =
1
N
∑
j 6=i
θ(ki − kj), (7)
where θ(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0 and θ(x) = 1 for x > 0. The variable defined in (7) clearly represents a
suitable definition of the social ranking, hence the social status, of a given individual in the network.
Thus, a reasonable measure of the individuals’ mobility in the social climbing game is given by the
change in the quantity defined above over a certain time lag ∆t, i.e. ∆qi(∆t) = qi(t+∆t)− qi(t), for
i = 1, . . . , N .
In Fig. 8 some typical behaviors of the q index defined in (7) are shown. All examples refer to
networks with N = 100 nodes and M = 1000 links. In such plots, the average of the change ∆q is
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Fig. 8 (Color online) Relation between the q index defined in (7) and its variation ∆q over a given time lag
∆t = 104 Monte Carlo steps for a network with N = 100 and M = 1000. The different curves refer to inverse
temperatures β = 0.02, 0.08, 0.16, respectively corresponding to values below, slightly above and well above
the critical value for the system under study. Points refer to the average variation ∆q over an equally spaced
grid of q values (going from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.05). Results obtained by averaging over 100 networks. Shaded
area (for β = 0.02) and error bars (for β = 0.08, 0.16) represent the central 68% of the events. Points and error
bars relative to different values of β have been shifted to enhance readability.
shown as a function of q, in order to provide information about the typical social mobility over a time
lag ∆t for an agent whose social ranking at the beginning of such a time lag is quantified by q. As
can be seen, depending on the preference for social status, i.e. on the inverse temperature parameter
β, very different situations can happen. In a rather disordered society (low values of β) the relation
between q and ∆q is clearly linear, and does not depend strongly on the time lag size ∆t. In particular,
it can be seen that, on average, individuals sitting at the bottom of the ranking typically end up higher
in the social ladder after some time, whereas individuals sitting atop the hierarchy are prevented from
keeping their social status intact for a long time. When the preference for social status crosses its
critical value, such a picture starts changing quite dramatically. For values of β slightly larger than the
critical value βc agents with low degrees still have a chance to climb up the social ladder, especially
over rather long time lags, whereas the dominant individuals (q & 0.9) typically get to keep their
social ranking. It is worth to remark that for low β the distribution of ki is not very skewed, so changes
in social ranking ∆qi are more frequent. In this sense, our notion of social mobility captures aspects
related to social dynamics but it also depends on the stationary distribution of qi’s, i.e. on the degree
of inequality. As β increases, the degree distribution acquires skewness, with few individuals having
many links and reduced social mobility. For β > βc the population separates into two groups, those
with ki of order N and those with very few links, with suppressed mobility across the whole social
hierarchy. Also, as can be seen from the right plot in Fig. 8, when the critical threshold is crossed
the social network becomes “fragmented”, as the q index is no longer defined over the whole interval
[0, 1]. In a strongly ordered society, i.e. β well above its critical value, agents with low degrees are
almost completely stuck, and all of the social mobility happens in the top half of the social network,
i.e. amongst agents with q > 0.5, and this is precisely due to the freezing of the dominant individuals
inducing social mobility to disappear completely also amongst nodes with small degrees. These results
complement, at a “microscopic” level, those presented in Fig. 7.
4 Conclusions
In summary, we have discussed a very simple model for the dynamics of a social network where the
agents’ quest for high status in the social hierarchy reinforces the latter while reducing social mobility.
The model is very stylized and far from a realistic description of social dynamics. Yet, it captures some
key ingredients that are enough to reproduce stylized facts known at least since the work of Vilfredo
Pareto [17]. Namely, Pareto observed that societies tend to organize in a hierarchical manner, with
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the emergence of “social elites”11. Our model, as well as Refs. [13,12], provides a formal framework
showing that individual incentives for high social status are enough to confer this property to the social
network, even in the absence of explicit discrimination of particular groups (e.g. cast system or racial
segregation) or preferential biases (e.g. hereditary rules). In addition, we find that the hierarchical state
is remarkably stable, with suppressed social mobility in the upper and lower parts of the hierarchy.
Notably, Pareto himself observed that social mobility is higher in the middle classes [17]. Furthermore,
our model exhibits a negative dependence between mobility and inequality, in the sense that more
hierarchically structured (i.e. unequal) societies manifest a lower degree of mobility. It is tempting to
relate this to the pervasive empirical observation that more unequal societies tend to have lower inter-
generational mobility [26,4,1]. Our model neglects important dimensions, such as wealth or political
power that, however, likely contribute to reinforce our results.
Secondly, we show that the social climbing game admits a potential function, thereby allowing us
to deploy techniques and concepts of statistical mechanics to understand the behavior of the system.
Statistical mechanics provides a natural language for discussing collective properties of societies. For
example, the emergence of a social hierarchy in a system of a priori identical individuals is an example
of spontaneous symmetry breaking, whereby the associated loss of ergodicity accounts for the reduced
social mobility.
The present paper was mostly focused on investigating the model via numerical simulations. The
mean field approach discussed in Ref. [19,18] is not applicable in our case, because the density of links
that plays the role of an order parameter in Ref. [19,18] is fixed in our case. Indeed, the phenomenology
we find is different from that of Ref. [19,18] as we do not find evidence of hysteresis phenomena: there
is no range of parameters where the disordered and the ordered societies are both stable. We speculate
that this might be related to the fact that in the social climbing game there are mechanisms by which
a social hierarchy can “nucleate” gradually in an ordered society, by forming social elites that grow
over time.
This and other issues can in principle be addressed within more sophisticated statistical mechanics
approaches. In this respect, it is worth to mention that it is possible to map the problem into that
of an interacting lattice gas that possibly admits for a full and exact statistical mechanics treatment.
Work in this direction is currently in progress.
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A Ergodicity of the dynamics
Let ΓC(N,M) be the space of connected graphs with N vertices and M edges. In order to prove ergodicity,
we have to show that, with a finite number of basic moves, we can reach any connected graph in ΓC(N,M),
starting from another arbitrary graph in the same set. Before delving into the technical details, we give a simple
intuitive sketch of this proof.
For a finite value of β, the dynamics consists of reversible moves as the one depicted in fig. 9; such moves
can be thought of as a “sliding” of the edge eik on the path of length one (k, j) from vertex k to vertex j.
The key observation to prove the ergodicity by induction is that, since the graph is finite and connected, there
always exists a path of minimum length that connects two arbitrarily chosen vertices in the graph. Then, we
can proceed in three steps.
1. Let there be two graphs in ΓC(N,M) which differ from each other only by an edge incident on the same
vertex, vk. We first prove that by means of basic moves, we can transform one into the other. To do so, it
suffices to slide the edge along the path that connects the other end of the edge, which we know to exist
because the graph is connected (Prop. 1, Prop. 2).
2. Let there be two graphs in ΓC(N,M) that differ by an edge with arbitrary ends. By applying the previous
step twice, we show that there exists a finite set of moves that allows us to reach one configuration starting
from the other (Prop. 3).
3. Finally, let there be two arbitrary graphs in ΓC(N,M). Moving one edge at time, we show by induction
that it is possible to reach one graph starting from the other with a finite number of moves. Thus, the
ergodicity is proved (Prop. 4).
We now proceed with the detailed Proof.
11 A similar concept of “power elites” has been discussed in [15].
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Fig. 9 The rewiring move (c-swap) of the dynamics.
Definition 1 (c-swap) Let us choose a labeling for the space of vertices V = {v1, . . . , vN} and an induced
labeling for the edges E = {eij} where eij = eji = (vi, vj) denotes the undirected edge between vi and vj . Let
us define a transformation σikij : Γ
C(N,M) 7→ ΓC(N,M), called corner swaps (c-swaps), as following
σikij (G) = G
′ = (V,E′) (8)
such that
E′ =
{
(E \ {eik}) ∪ {eij} if (ekj , eik ∈ E) ∧ (eij /∈ E)
E otherwise
. (9)
Proposition 1 Let G = (V,E) and G′ = (V,E′) be two graphs in ΓC(N,M) that differ by an edge incident
on the same vertex, i.e. |E| = |E′| =M , |E′ ∩E| =M − 1, E \E′ = {eik} and E
′ \E = {eij}, and such that
the shortest path P from vk to vj does not contain neither vi nor any of its neighbors.
There exists an integer l and a finite sequence of graphs in ΓC(N,M), Gn such that:
(i) G = G0 and G′ = Gl.
(ii) For all 0 ≤ n < l there exist adjacent vertices vkn ,vkn+1 such that G
n+1 = σiknikn+1(G
n), where k0 = k and
kl = j.
Proof Let l be the length of P .
Let vk1 be the unique neighbor of vk that lies in P . If we set G
1 = σikik1(G), the c-swap reduces the distance
between vi and vj , since the neighbor of vk that lies in P must have a distance l− 1 from vj . We reiterate the
procedure on G1 and obtain in such a way a sequence of graphs that satisfies property (ii). Now, since at any
step the length of P diminishes by 1, after the l-th step, in the graph Gl vi and vj will be neighbors. Thus,
since no other edge was changed by applying c-swaps, Gl = G′ proving property (i).
Proposition 2 Let G = (V,E) and G′ = (V,E′) be two graphs in ΓC(N,M) which differ by an edge incident
on the same vertex, i.e. |E| = |E′| =M , |E′ ∩ E| =M − 1, E \ E′ = {eik} and E
′ \E = {eij}.
There exists an integer l and a finite sequence of graphs in ΓC(N,M), Gn such that:
(i) G = G0 and G′ = Gl
(ii) For all 0 ≤ n ≤ l there exist adjacent vertices vkn ,vkn+1 such that G
n+1 = σiknikn+1(G
n).
Proof Let P be the shortest path in G from vk to vj that does not contain (vk, vi).
There are four possible cases :
(i) P does not contain neither vi nor any of its neighbors other than vk. The thesis is proven applying
proposition 1 directly to P .
(ii) P contains vi. Let P1 be the shortest path from vk to vi that does not contain the edge (vk, vi). let
P2 be the shortest path from vi to vj , clearly P = P1 ⊕ P2, where ⊕ is the path concatenation. Since
by construction there are no neighbors of vk in P2 (otherwise P would not contain vi) we can apply
proposition 1 and reach G′′ = (V, (E \ {eki})∪ {ekj}); on the other hand there cannot be neighbors of vj
in P1 (otherwise there would be a shortest path not containing vi) and thus applying again proposition 1
along P1 we reach G
′ proving the thesis.
(iii) P does not contain vi but two of its neighbors, c and f such that c 6= vk, f 6= vk and |c, vk| < |f, vk|, where
|·, ·| represents the graph distance between two vertices. We first note that c and f must be neighbors,
otherwise P should include vi. Then, as in case (ii), by minimality we can write P = P1 ⊕ (c, f) ⊕ P2
where P1 is the shortest path from vk to c and P2 is the shortest path from f to vj . It is easy to see that
Q2 = (vi, f)⊕P2 is a shortest path from vi to vj : if it were not so, there would exist a path Q
′
2 from vi to vj
strictly shorter than Q2, but in that case P1⊕(c, vi)⊕Q
′
2 would be a shortest path from vk to vj containing
vi, in contradiction with our hypotheses. A similar argument holds for Q1. As before, since, by minimality,
there cannot be neighbors of vk in P2, it is possible to reach the graph G
′′ = (V, (E \ {eki}) ∪ {ekj}) by
applying proposition 1 to Q2; since by minimality there cannot be neighbors of vj in P1, we can apply
proposition 1 to G′′ along Q2 and reach G
′ proving the thesis.
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(iv) The shortest path P contains only one neighbor of vi other than vk, let us call itm. As before, P = P1⊕P2
where P1 is the shortest path from vk to m and P2 is the shortest path from m to vj . Since by construction
there cannot be other neighbors of i in P2, we can apply proposition 1 to P2 and reach the graph
G∗ = (V, (E \ {eim}) ∪ {eij}. On the other hand, by construction there cannot be neighbors of vi in P1
other than vk and thus we can apply proposition 1 to P2 and reach G
′ proving the thesis.
Proposition 3 Let G = (V,E) and G′ = (V,E′) be two graphs in ΓC(N,M) such that |E| = |E′| = M and
|E ∩E′| =M − 1. Let us assume that, in particular, E = {eij} ∪ (E ∩E
′) and E′ = {ehk} ∪ (E ∩E
′).
Thus there exists an integer l and a finite sequence of graphs in ΓC(N,M), Gn such that:
(i) G = G0 and G′ = Gl
(ii) For all 0 ≤ n < l there exist adjacent vertices vkn ,vkn+1 such that G
n+1 = σiknikn+1(G
n).
Proof Let us define the graph G′′ = (V,E′′) such that E′′ = (E \ {eij})∪{eih}. Applying proposition 2 first to
graphs G and G′′ and then to graph G′′ and G′ proves the thesis.
Definition 2 (g-swap) Let G = (V,E) and G′ = (V,E′) be two graphs in ΓC(N,M) which differ at most
by an edge, that is such that |E| = |E′| = M and |E ∩ E′| = M − 1. Let us assume that, in particular,
E = {eij} ∪ (E ∩ E
′) and E′ = {ehk} ∪ (E ∩E
′).
We define a global swap or g-swap of the edge eij to the edge ehk a transformation such that:
G′ = Σhkij (G) (10)
Proposition 3 simply states that any global swap can be obtained as the composition of a minimal set of corner
swaps between adjacent vertices.
Proposition 4 Let G = (V,E) and G = (V,E′) be two graphs in ΓC(N,M). There exists an integer d and a
sequence of graphs Gn(V,En) in Γ
C(N,M) such that:
(i) G = G0 and G′ = Gd
(ii) For all 0 ≤ n < d there exist four vertices vi , vj ,vh and vk such that G
n+1 = Σhkij (G
n)
Proof Let Z = (V,Z = E ∩E′), and let us define δ = |Z|. We proceed by induction on the number δ.
Base case If δ =M − 1, the Thesis is trivially true because of Proposition 3.
Inductive step Let us assume that the Thesis holds for δ =M − d, we want to show that this implies that it
also holds for δ =M−d−1, with d < M−1. Let us assume that G = (V,E) and G′ = (V, E′) are such that
|E′∩E| =M−d−1. Let eij ∈ E \ (E∩E
′) and ehk ∈ E
′ \ (E∩E′). Moreover, let E′′ = (E \{eij})∪{ehk}.
By construction, |E ∩ E′′| = M − 1 and |E′ ∩ E′′| = M − d. Finally, let G′′ = (V,E′′). Since G′′ and
G′ differ by M − d edges, by inductive assumption there exists a sequence Gi, with i ∈ [0, d], such that
G0 = G′ and Gd = G′′, that satisfies the Thesis. Moreover, by Proposition 3, there exists a g-swap such that
G = Σijhk(G
′′). Thus, the complete sequence G′ = G0, G1, · · · , G′′ = Gd,G = Gd+1 satisfies the Thesis.
Proposition 4 and proposition 3 state simply that any two connected graphs with the same number of edges
can be obtained one from the other applying a finite sequence of c-swaps. Moreover, since the number of edges
is finite, then there must be a minimal sequence of c-swaps that connects any two of such graphs. Since, for
finite β, all c-swaps are allowed with nonzero probability, this proves the ergodicity. 
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